

El método socrático en Esquines

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Resumen:

El objetivo principal de este estudio es investigar la descripción del método socrático de Esquines de Esfeto, con especial foco en la llamada «ἐπαγωγή socrática» y el relacionado argumento por analogía. El trabajo comprende tres secciones principales, dedicadas al examen de estas herramientas metodológicas socráticas en el diálogo *Aspasia* (i), a través de una lectura atenta del testimonio de Cicerón en *De Inv.* 1.31.51-53; en el *Alcibiades* (ii), refiriendo especialmente a tres fragmentos del diálogo preservado por Elio Aristides (*De rhet.* 1.61-62; 1.74); y en el *Milciades* (iii), con especial atención a un fragmento del papiro (*POxy.* 2890 verso), el cual presenta también un caso de la llamada «expert-analogy». Este análisis apunta a reconstruir una imagen lo más completa posible del método socrático retratado por Esquines, que pueda ser comparada provechosamente con aquellas presentadas por Platón y Jenofonte. En la conclusión, se realizan algunas consideraciones finales a la luz de las más amplias descripciones provistas por los diálogos de Platón y las obras socráticas de Jenofonte.

Palabras clave:

Esquines de Esfeto, Sócrates, método socrático, inducción, argumento por analogía.

The Socratic Method in Aeschines

Abstract:

The main objective of this study is to investigate Aeschines of Sphettus' account of the Socratic method, with a special focus on the so-called «Socratic ἐπαγωγή» and the (related) argument by analogy. The paper comprises three main sections, devoted to an examination of these Socratic methodological tools in the *Aspasia* (i), through a close reading of Cicero's testimony in *De inv.* 1.31.51-53; in the *Alcibiades* (ii), by especially referring to three fragments of the dialogue preserved by Aelius Aristides (*De rhet.* 1.61-62; 1.74); and in the *Miltiades* (iii), with special regard to a papyrus fragment (*POxy.* 2890 verso) which also presents an occurrence of the so-called «expert-analogy». The analysis is aimed to reconstruct as complete a picture as possible of Aeschines' portrayal of the Socratic method, one that can be profitably compared to those presented by Plato and Xenophon. In the concluding section some final considerations are thus made in the light of the broader accounts provided by Plato's dialogues and Xenophon's Socratic works.

Key words:

Aeschines of Sphettus, Socrates, Socratic method, induction, argument by analogy.

1. INTRODUCTION

A large and growing body of literature has investigated the Socratic method and particularly the

«Socratic method of teaching». Unsurprisingly, many of these studies have been devoted to Plato's Socratic dialogues¹, with a major focus on the refutative procedure of ἔλεγχος², but (to a lesser degree) Xenophon's Socratic

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¹ To give but few examples, see BENSON, H. H., «Socratic Method», in MORRISON, D. R., *The Cambridge Companion to Socrates*, New York, 2011, pp. 179-200; BRICKHOUSE, T. C. & SMITH, N. D., «Socratic Teaching and Socratic Method», in SIEGEL, H., *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education*, New York, 2009, pp. 177-194. In the latter study it is expressly stated that «it is plainly the Socrates of Plato's early or 'Socratic' dialogues that people have in mind when they discuss the 'Socratic method' or 'Socratic teaching'» (p. 191, note 1).

² The studies published are too numerous to be mentioned exhaustively. The nature of the so-called «Socratic method» and of ἔλεγχος in Plato raises a variety of questions and thorny problems that falls beyond the scope of this paper. For the most recent debate see at least VLASTOS, G., «The Socratic Elenchus», *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 1 (1983), pp. 27-58; BENSON, H. H., «The Priority of Definition and the Socratic Elenchus», *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 8 (1990), pp. 19-65; BENSON, H. H., «The Dissolution of the Problem of the Elenchus», *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 13 (1995), pp. 45-112; GIANNANTONI, G., *Dialogo socratico e nascita della dialettica nella filosofia di Platone*, edizione postuma a cura di Bruno Centrone, Napoli, 2005, pp. 141-195. Scholars have gone so far as to assert that «there is no such thing as the 'Socratic elenchos'»: BRICKHOUSE, T. C. & SMITH, N. D., «The Socratic Elenchos?», in SCOTT, G. A., *Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato's Dialogues and Beyond*, University Park (PA), 2002, p. 147.

writings have also been taken into account in this regard³.

The present paper aims to explore a further account on Socrates' method, namely the portrayal provided by Aeschines of Sphettus' dialogues. Even though Aeschines' account immediately evokes the issue of ἔρωϛ, which is also closely bound up with Socrates' «method of teaching»⁴, I would like to focus here on two different aspects, recurring in more than one work: the so-called «Socratic ἐπαγωγὴ» and the related argument by analogy.

Now, like the Socratic method in general, Socratic ἐπαγωγὴ has been mainly investigated with regard to Plato⁵ or, at most, to Plato and Xenophon⁶, or Plato and Aristotle⁷. The use of expert-analogies in the *logoi Sokratikoi*, on the other hand, has been recently examined by Sandstad, who also takes two of Aeschines' dialogues briefly into account⁸.

What seems to be lacking, then, is a comprehensive study of the Aeschinean Socrates' method, one that brings together – in particular – all the references to ἐπαγωγὴ and to the argument by analogy in Aeschines' dialogues. The following three sections of the paper will thus investigate this aspect of the Socratic method in the *Aspasia* (section II), the *Alcibiades* (section III) and the *Miltiades* (section IV).

As far as the *Aspasia* is concerned, a fundamental testimony is provided by Cicero, who reports a conversation between Aspasia, Xenophon and his wife precisely to illustrate a case of induction (*De inv.* 1.31.51-53). Indeed, the quotation of the *Aspasia* passage is placed at the beginning of a section on the different types of argumentation (1.31.51-77), whose first part is devoted to *inductio* (1.31.51-56). Cicero's testimony offers a good starting point for our analysis, as it features both the above-mentioned

elements of the Socratic method: not only does the whole passage have the structure of the Socratic ἐπαγωγὴ, but Aspasia resorts –more specifically– to the argument by analogy, presented in other dialogues as a Socratic methodological tool.

This is the case with the *Alcibiades* and, more specifically, with the three fragments preserved by Aelius Aristides (*De rhet.* 1.61-62; 1.74). Assuming –as we will see– a particular order for these fragments, Socrates appears to be adopting an argument by analogy in the last section of the dialogue: he would first be presenting some examples drawn from human experience (sickness and healing), where it is possible to benefit from both ἀνθρωπίνῃ τέχνῃ and θεία μοῖρα, and then he would be applying this opposition to his personal experience with Alcibiades, expressing his conviction that he could improve the young man θεία μοῖρα and not τέχνη.

A further occurrence of the argument by analogy seems to be found in the *Miltiades*, at least according to a papyrus fragment (*POxy.* 2890 *verso*) which hints at an analogy with the field of τέχναι, established within the context of a discussion on παιδεία. The (misleading) analogy between the teaching of virtue and the teaching of the banausic arts is arguably drawn by Socrates himself, with the aim of opposing the (easy) search for teachers of specific τέχναι, and the (much more complicated) search for teachers of virtue.

In the light of the fuller accounts provided in the *Aspasia* and the *Alcibiades*, the last part of the paper will thus attempt to analyse the *Miltiades* fragment, so as to reconstruct, in the concluding section (V), as complete a picture as possible of Aeschines' portrayal of the Socratic method, one that can be profitably juxtaposed and compared to those presented by Plato and Xenophon.

³ WELLMAN, R. R., «Socratic Method in Xenophon», *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 37/2 (1976), pp. 307-318; MOORE, C., «Xenophon's Socratic Education in *Memorabilia* Book 4», in MOORE, C. & STAVRU, A., *Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue*, Leiden, 2018, pp. 500-520.

⁴ See KAHN, C. H., «Aeschines on Socratic *Eros*», in VANDER WAERDT, P. A., *The Socratic Movement*, Ithaca-London, 1994, pp. 87-106 and MÁRSICO, C., «Shock, Erotics, Plagiarism, and Fraud: Aspects of Aeschines of Sphettus' Philosophy», in MOORE, C. & STAVRU, A., *Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue*, pp. 202-220.

⁵ KAHN, C. H., *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form*, Cambridge, 1996, p. 111 ff. In earlier studies sections or chapters on ἐπαγωγὴ are included in works devoted to Plato or to the Socratic method in Plato: see ROBINSON, R., *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, Oxford, 1953, pp. 35-50; GULLEY, N., *The Philosophy of Socrates*, London, 1968, pp. 13-21; SANTAS, G., *Socrates: Philosophy in Plato's Early Dialogues*, Boston, 1979, pp. 136-155. See also the brief overview in GUTHRIE, W. K. C., *Socrates*, Cambridge, 1971, pp. 105-110.

⁶ McPHERRAN, M., «Socratic *Epagógē* and Socratic Induction», *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 45/3 (2007), pp. 347-364.

⁷ AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», in FINK, J. L., *The Development of Dialectic from Plato to Aristotle*, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 224-250. He also concisely tackles Socratic induction in Xenophon (230-232). A study by McCaskey broadens the analysis of induction to the later Socratic tradition, specifically to Bacon's and Whewell's philosophies: see McCASKEY, J. P., «Induction in the Socratic Tradition», in BIONDI, P. C. & GROARKE, L., *Shifting the Paradigm: Alternative Perspectives on Induction*, Berlin, 2014, pp. 161-192.

⁸ SANDSTAD, P., «The Logical Structure of Socrates' Expert-Analogies», in MOORE, C. & STAVRU, A., *Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue*, pp. 319-335. On Socrates' expert-analogies see also APARICIO VILLALONGA, C., *El ejemplo de los oficios en los diálogos de Platón: una vía de acceso a su filosofía*, Tesis Doctoral, Universidad de las Islas Baleares, 2014, and AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», pp. 228-229, who briefly touches upon Aeschines' *Aspasia*.

2. THE ASPASIA

Cicero's quotation in *De inventione* 1.31.51-53 (VI A 70 SSR = 108 P.)⁹ preserves the largest surviving section of Aeschines' *Aspasia*—a lost dialogue that most testimonies depict as centred on the problem of παιδεία¹⁰—and represents one of the richest sources for reconstructing the philosophical content of this work¹¹.

The passage from the *Aspasia* is quoted at the beginning of a section on the different types of argumentation (1.31.51-77), which includes a first part devoted to *inductio* (1.31.51-56) and a second part devoted to the deductive method (*rationatio*: 1.31.57-75)¹². Paragraph 51 starts with the general statement «*omnis [...] argumentatio aut per inductionem tractanda est aut per ratiocinationem*», followed by a definition of *inductio* that Cicero provides just before quoting a portion of Aeschines' dialogue¹³:

«Induction is a form of argument which leads the person with whom one is arguing to give assent to certain undisputed facts; through this assent it wins his approval of a doubtful proposition because this resembles the facts to which he has assented.»¹⁴

In other words, Cicero characterises *inductio* as a kind of argument that gains agreement to a doubtful proposition by securing first agreement to some similar uncontroversial facts. To illustrate, then, a case of induction, Cicero reports a conversation between Aspasia, Xenophon and his wife¹⁵, which he explicitly states to have found *apud Socraticum Aeschinen*¹⁶. Here the Milesian is indeed depicted as adopting a method to persuade her interlocutors of claims they might not otherwise hold, by referring them

to similar things that they are more willing to accept as true.

The well-known passage presents Aspasia as mediating between the two spouses: the Milesian first asks Xenophon's wife whether, if her neighbour had a better gold ornament, she would prefer her neighbour's gold to her own; next, she repeats the same question by using the examples of clothes and «other feminine finery». In both cases, the wife answers that she would prefer her neighbour's goods. Aspasia then formulates the third question as follows: «Well now, if she had a better husband than you have, would you prefer your husband or hers?». The woman blushes at this, and Aspasia begins to question to Xenophon in much the same way. Indeed, she asks the husband the same questions by taking horses and farms as examples; as expected, just like his wife, Xenophon answers that he would prefer his neighbour's horse or estate if he had better ones. The third question too is phrased in a similar way («now, if he had a better wife than you have, would you prefer yours or his?») and produces a similar reaction: Xenophon too falls silent. Then Aspasia draws her conclusions, which is worth quoting at length together with Cicero's final comment:

«“Since both of you have failed to tell me the only thing I wished to hear, I myself will tell what both of you are thinking: that you, madam, wish to have the best husband, and you, Xenophon, desire above all things to have the finest wife. Therefore unless you can contrive that there be no better man or finer woman on earth, you will certainly always be in dire want of what you consider best, namely, that you be the husband of the very best of wives, and that she be wedded to the very best of men”. In this instance, because assent has been given to undisputed statements, the result is that the point which

⁹ The double numbering of the testimonies on Aeschines refers to the collection GIANNANTONI, G., *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae*, collegit, disposuit, apparatus notisque instruxit G. Giannantoni, Napoli, 1990 and to the edition PENTASSUGLIO, F., *Eschine di Sfetto. Tutte le testimonianze*, Turnhout, 2017.

¹⁰ Besides Cicero's testimony, see in particular Plutarch. *Vit. Pericl.* 24.5-6 p. 165b-c (VI A 66 SSR = 99 P.); Plat. *Menex.* 235e (VI A 66 SSR = 101 P.); Maxim. Tyr. *Philosoph.* 38.4 (VI A 66 SSR = 102 P.); Theodoret. *Graec. affect. cur.* 1.17 (VI A 66 SSR = 103 P.); Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.36 (VI A 72 SSR = 112 P.); Xen. *Oecon.* 3.14 (VI A 71 SSR = 111 P.).

¹¹ I had the opportunity to tackle Cicero's account on the Aeschinean Socrates' method (with special regard to the role of ἔπος) in PENTASSUGLIO, F., «*Paideutikos eros: Aspasia as an 'alter Socrates'*», *Archai*, 30 (2020), pp. 9-16.

¹² The book ends with some final considerations about the importance of *variatio* (76) and a discussion about the difference between philosophy and rhetoric. On the structure of book 1 see RASCHIERI, A. A., «Traduzione e apprendimento retorico: (Cic. *inv.* 1.51 s.)», *Lexis*, 31 (2013), pp. 315-317.

¹³ The whole of book 1 is rich in quotations from literary works (mostly in verse), which Cicero inserts for the sake of exemplification. The quoting of an extensive portion of Aeschines' dialogue must be related to the use of translations from Greek as an exercise in Latin schools of rhetoric, a practise which is well documented in Cicero's *De oratore* (1.155), in Suetonius' *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* (25.4), and in Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* (10.5.2-4).

¹⁴ All the English translations of Cicero's *De inventione* are by HUBBELL, H. M., *Cicero. De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica*, London, 1949 (slightly modified).

¹⁵ Other versions of the same conversation are reported by Quintilian (*Inst. orat.* 5.11.27-29 = VI A 70 SSR = 109 P.), who only quotes the first part, and by Victorinus (*In rhet.* 1.31 p. 240, 20-241, 15 = VI A 70 SSR = 110 P.). They both depend on Cicero and thus cannot be considered independent sources: see already HERMANN, K. F., *De Aeschinis Socratici reliquiis*, Göttingen, 1850, p. 16. The same anecdote (in Cicero's version) features in Albin. *Rhet.* p. 540 Halm, where it is reported in an anonymous form and referred to a *philosophus quidam*. In Quintilian's version it crops up again in Iul. Vict. *Rhet.* p. 408 Halm.

¹⁶ On the attribution of the fragment to Aeschines' *Aspasia*, see already KRAUSS, H., *Aeschinis Socratici Reliquiae*, Lipsiae, 1911, p. 71 (followed by DITTMAR, H., *Aischines von Sphetos. Studien zur Literaturgeschichte der Sokratiker*, Berlin, 1912, p. 33). He noted, however, that Cicero's version presumably does not represent a literal translation of Aeschines' text («*ut probabile est in scriptoribus, qui ipsi de suo, non simpliciter imitantes, sententias fingant*»; p. 43). In the absence of the original Greek text, we cannot analyse the translation technique, nor can we assess the degree of «fidelity» to the Greek model.

would appear doubtful if asked by itself is through analogy conceded as certain, and this is due to the method employed in putting the question.»

The dialogical method adopted here by Aspasia earned her the moniker of «female Socrates», a label employed by several scholars to depict the Milesian¹⁷. Indeed, in general terms, the way she addresses both partners with pressing questions, to the point of leading them into an *aporia* which prevents any further answer, suggests a proximity between Aspasia's method and Socrates' elenctic procedure. In the following lines, Cicero himself is quite explicit in this regard:

«Socrates used this conversational method a good deal, because he wished to present no arguments himself, but preferred to get a result from the material which the interlocutor had given him – a result which the interlocutor was bound to approve as following necessarily from what he had already granted.»

More particularly, Aspasia makes use of *ἐπαγωγή* in her questioning, a method that –according to Aristotle (*Meth.* 13.4, 1078b27-29)– Socrates employed in his elenctic investigations. It is noteworthy, in this respect, that when Cicero goes back to the issue of *ἐπαγωγή* in the *Topica*¹⁸, he again cites Socrates with regard to the *locus ex similitudine* (42)¹⁹.

Now, strictly speaking, Aristotle ascribes Socrates –as a contribution to a science of principles– τὸς [...] ἐπακτικὸς λόγους; hence, not inductive arguments *per se*, but rather a «technically competent handling of such arguments»²⁰. As is well-known, by the term «induction» Aristotle technically refers to an argumentative movement from the «particular» (καθ' ἑκάστον, κατὰ μέρος) to what he calls the «universal» (καθόλου)²¹, and we would look in

vain for an occurrence of *ἐπαγωγή* fitting this definition in Aeschines' dialogues.

Nonetheless, as Ausland has clearly shown²², from a relatively early age there is evidence of a conception of induction different from Aristotle's, one that makes no recourse to a distinction between particular and general, but rather characterises induction as an argument «from one or more familiar things to something further that is similar to these»²³. This is precisely the acceptation of «induction» we find in the section of *De inventione* at issue, which significantly ends with an explanation of the Socratic method. Indeed, before providing examples of inductive reasoning drawn from civil cases (55 ff.), Cicero tackles the issue from a theoretical point of view, in the form of a commentary on Aeschines' passage²⁴.

As specified immediately afterwards, Cicero deems it necessary for the argument that one brings forward by way of simile to be such that «its truth must be granted» (53). He thus believes that the consequence in view of which one resorts to an inductive reasoning must bear a close similarity to the premises proposed as not doubtful. The outcome of this method is described in the Aspasia example: the interlocutor (in this case Xenophon and his wife) can either (1) decline to give an answer, or (2) admit the validity of the thesis proposed or (3) deny it. Now, if the proposition is denied, one should either show its resemblance to those things which have been already admitted, or resort to some other induction; if the thesis is granted, the argumentation can be brought to a close. If, instead, the interlocutor keeps silent, then «he must be lured into giving an answer» (*elicienda responsio est*), or –since silence can be seen as a kind of reply– one may also bring the discussion to a close, taking the silence to be equivalent to an admission (54).

¹⁷ Aeschines' Aspasia was first defined as a «weblicher Sokrates» by HIRZEL, R., *Der Dialog. Ein literarhistorischer Versuch*, Leipzig, 1895, vol. 1, p. 80. The definition was then adopted by KAHN, C. H., «Aeschines on Socratic *Eros*», p. 101, and DÖRING, K., «The Students of Socrates», in MORRISON, D. R., *The Cambridge Companion to Socrates*, New York, 2011, p. 31.

¹⁸ Cicero's discussion of the inductive method had a significant influence on later accounts on this topic (by Quintilian, Fortunatianus and Marius Victorinus): see RASCHIERI, A. A., «Traduzione e apprendimento retorico...», p. 316.

¹⁹ In all likelihood, Cicero here is following Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (2.20, 1393b): indeed, when the Stagirite deals with the *παράδειγμα* (defined as «similar to induction»: ὅμοιον ἐπαγωγή), as an example of comparison he puts forward the «sayings of Socrates» (*παραβολὴ δὲ τὰ Σωκρατικά*).

²⁰ This is how the expression is interpreted by AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», p. 229, who highlights Aristotle's use of an adjective deriving from *ἐπάγειν* but ending in -ικός. He also argues that the following reference to universal definition does not refer to the goal of Socrates' inductive arguments, but to a distinct contribution pertaining to his investigations in the realm of morals; cf. ROBINSON, R., *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, pp. 48-50; *contra* see McCASKEY, J. P., «Induction in the Socratic Tradition», p. 163. On the mistranslation of Aristotle's ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι as «inductive arguments», see VLASTOS, G., *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, Ithaca, 1991, p. 267, who deems it as «virtually ubiquitous in the scholarly literature».

²¹ See *Top.* 1.12; *Post. An.* 1.1.

²² AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», p. 228.

²³ Interestingly, Albinus (*Isag.* 158.1) will distinguish two kinds of induction: one from similar to similar and another from particular to general.

²⁴ As Raschieri has pointed out, Cicero's use of a philosophical «insertion» is far from being an accessory element or a mere exemplification of concepts already expounded in an abstract form. On the contrary, the quotation from Aeschines' *Aspasia* plays such a central role that it lends structure to the overall argument and does not require any further addition except some brief introductory and conclusive comments; see RASCHIERI, A. A., «Traduzione e apprendimento retorico», p. 317. Although Victorinus follows the theoretical framework of his source, he enriches Cicero's quotation with further elements. First, he delimits «in general» (*generaliter*) the scope and domain of induction, which pertains to philosophy, rhetoric, but also «fictional stories» (*etiam in fabulis*). Then, he reports Cicero's definition of *inductio* and provides a detailed explanation of it. At this point he inserts the *exemplum philosophicum* drawn from Aeschines' *Aspasia* (*In rhet.* 1.31 p. 240, 20-241, 15).

Now, besides lending the whole passage the structure of an epagógic argumentation, Aspasia uses a more specific methodological tool, also adopted by Socrates elsewhere: the argument by analogy²⁵. According to the tradition stemming from Aristotle, an inductive argument is supposed to be based on one or more paradigmatic cases often termed «examples» (the παράδειγμα dealt with in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, 2.20, 1393b can be interpreted as the rhetorical version of induction)²⁶.

In this regard, Döring²⁷ convincingly points out Aspasia's goals in employing the argument by analogy, namely:

1) to make Xenophon and his wife aware that they are caught in an inconsistency (between their belief that they love no one else as much as each other, and the admission that they would favour a superior spouse, should one come along);

2) to make them realise that they are capable of ending this inconsistency by trying to become as virtuous as possible.

In brief, Aspasia employs the argument by analogy with the aim of conveying the idea that the search for a better husband or wife is vain unless both partners aim to be ἀριστοί. The promotion of moral (self-)improvement recalls, once again, the figure of Socrates, also (but not only)²⁸ in Aeschines' dialogues, and particularly (as we will see in section III) in the *Alcibiades*²⁹.

Aside from the final purpose of the argument by analogy, a peculiar use of it seems to be shared by Aeschines' Aspasia and Aeschines' Socrates. Just like Socrates in the *Miltiades* fragment (see section IV), the Milesian does not use analogies with a plain explanatory or illustrative function. More subtly, Aspasia's questions are intended to bring to light the undesirable consequences in which one may incur by applying *through analogy* the same reasoning adopted

in previous cases –consisting in examples drawn from the interlocutor's everyday life– and thus by (improperly) extending what was true for jewels and clothes, or horses and farms, to the sphere of marital relationships.

Similarly, as regards the more general epagógic argumentation, it may be noted that Aspasia first induces both interlocutors to acknowledge their desire for «material» possessions like those their neighbours might have, and only afterwards are these possessions set in parallel to their marital relationship. Only once the unpleasant possibility of coveting one's neighbour's spouse is brought to light, can Aspasia set out the opposite perspective of two partners seeking to deserve each other³⁰.

In conclusion, considering that Cicero presents the whole conversation as reported by Socrates himself within Aeschines' dialogue («*demonstrat Socrates cum Xenophontis uxore [...]*»)³¹, a set of hints and references³² may be seen to suggest that Aeschines projects some Socratic aspects onto Aspasia. The use of inductive reasoning and of the argument by analogy is one of them. The latter, significantly, is employed by Aeschines' Socrates in at least two other works, which are worth taking specifically into account.

3. THE *ALCIBIADES*

A fundamental testimony on the *Alcibiades* (the best-preserved work by Aeschines, along with the *Aspasia*) is provided by Aelius Aristides, who quotes three fragments of the dialogue in his *De rhetorica* (VI A 53 SSR = fr. 81-82 P.).

Aristides reports the three excerpts as follows:

1.61-62: «If I thought that I could be helpful through some art (τινι τέχνῃ), I should find myself guilty of much stupidity. But as it is, I thought that this had been granted to me by a divine portion (θεία μοίρα) in respect to Alcibiades. And none of this should be wondered at». (62) [...] «For many of the sick become well, some by human art (ἀνθρωπίνῃ τέχνῃ), some by a divine portion

²⁵ For two specific types of epagógic argument, the mode of reasoning has been identified as that of inductive analogy: (a) arguments from a single proposition or set of coordinate propositions that serve as premises to another proposition superordinate to the premise set, and (b) arguments from a single proposition or set of coordinate propositions that serve as premises to another proposition superordinate to the premise set followed by an inference back to a subordinate proposition (in those cases where the superordinate claim goes unmentioned); see McPHERRAN, M., «Socratic Epagógé and Socratic Induction», p. 349. Cf. Arist. *An. Pr.* 2.24; *Rhet.* 2.20, 1393a26-b3 on «argument by example».

²⁶ AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», p. 233. Ἐπαγωγή has been interpreted, in turn, as part of a larger technique called «the use of cases», which ranges from illustrative example to analogical inference from a single case, to complete enumeration: see ROBINSON, R., *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, pp. 43-47.

²⁷ See DÖRING, K., «The Students of Socrates», pp. 31-32.

²⁸ See for instance Plat. *Apol.* 25b.

²⁹ According to Aelius Aristides (*De rhet.* 1.74), the dialogue ends with the very expression βελτίω ποιῆσαι.

³⁰ See AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», p. 232.

³¹ It has been argued that Aeschines may have included in the *Aspasia* a conversation similar to that between Socrates and Diotima in Plato's *Symposium*, as shown by the several references in the sources to the dialogical form of the discussion: see MÁRSICO, C., *Los filósofos socráticos, Testimonios y fragmentos*, vol. 2: *Antístenes, Fedón, Esquines y Simón*, Buenos Aires, 2014, p. 404, Note 85. Such an analogy has led certain scholars to conjecture that the Socrates-Diotima exchange in the *Symposium* represents Plato's «response» to Aeschines' *Aspasia*; see GAISER, K., «Review of B. Ehlers, *Eine vorplatonische Deutung des sokratischen Eros: Der Dialog Aspasia des Sokratikers Aischines*, Munich 1966», *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 51 (1969), pp. 202-204; KAHN, C. H., «Aeschines on Socratic *Eros*», pp. 100-101.

³² There is no shortage of sources insisting on Socrates' relationship with Aspasia, namely Plato (*Menex.* 235e), Maximus of Tyre (*Philosoph.* 38.4), Plutarch (*Vit. Pericl.* 24.5-6 p. 165b-c) and Theodoret of Cyrus (*Graec. aff. cur.* 1.17).

(θεία μοῖρα). Those by human art, cured by doctors; those by a divine portion, desire leads to what will profit them»³³.

1.74: «Through the love which I had for Alcibiades (διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα ὃν ἐτύγγανον ἐρῶν Ἀλκιβιάδου) I had felt no different from the Bacchantes. For whenever the Bacchantes become inspired, they draw milk and honey from sources where others cannot even draw water. And although I knew no study (οὐδὲν μάθημα) by which I might usefully educate a man, still I thought that by associating with him I would improve him th (ξυνὸν ἂν ἐκείνῳ διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν βελτίω ποιῆσαι).»

The fragments appear in Dittmar's collection as fr. 11a-c³⁴, and in the following studies scholars have usually taken it for granted that the sequence of quotations reported by Aristides corresponds to their actual order of appearance in Aeschines' work³⁵.

The first fragment (*De rhet.* 1.61) draws an essential distinction between two ways in which one can «be helpful» (ὠφελῆσαι) to others, opposing to τέχνη an ability which is granted θεία μοῖρα, for «divine dispensation». Such an opposition is exemplified in the following fragment (*De rhet.* 1.62), where the act of making other people better is compared to healing from sickness: indeed, some sick people are treated by doctors and recover thanks to an ἀνθρωπίνῃ τέχνῃ; others recover θεία μοῖρα, thanks to a divine dispensation by which their desire (ἐπιθυμία) directly leads them to what can improve their condition and cure them. In the third fragment (*De rhet.* 1.74) the above-traced distinction is explicitly referred to Alcibiades, and the ability to improve others is directly associated with ἔρωσ: Socrates denies that he possesses any art (τέχνη) or science (μάθημα) to benefit other people; nonetheless, he thought he could improve Alcibiades διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν, «through love»³⁶. This ἔρωσ that he *happened* to be feeling (ἐτύγγανον ἐρῶν) for the young man put him in a condition similar to that of the Bacchantes, who –filled with the god– can «draw milk and honey from sources where others cannot even draw water».

Now, in opposition to the traditional order of the three fragments within Aeschines' dialogue, Joyal has convincingly proposed a different interpretation³⁷. While preserving the position of the last fragment, which Aristides himself presents as the conclusion of the dialogue, Joyal suggests we reverse the order of the first two excerpts,

arguing that the passage on the two «ways» of healing from sickness preceded the claims by Socrates reported as the first fragment.

It is to be noted, first of all, that the order of the fragments proposed by Aristides contributed to his narrative build-up, which aimed to defend rhetoric against the attacks carried out by Plato, especially in the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus*. Aristides argues, in particular, against Plato's thesis that rhetoric is not a τέχνη, but an ἐμπειρία or a τριβή (*Gorg.* 463b3-4). To this end, he resorts to the authority of Socrates, whose opinions Plato would not dare reject (see 1.62). Hence, in support of the efficacy of θεία μοῖρα as a suitable alternative to τέχνη, he quotes the words of Aeschines' Socrates about his personal experience with Alcibiades (1). Then, he generalises the argument –again through Aeschines (2)– to all activities that can equally benefit from both τέχνη and θεία μοῖρα, among which rhetoric shall be included (cf. 1.65). Aristides' position, therefore, basically draws its strength and credibility from Socrates' example.

If, however, we shift our focus to the structure and content of Aeschines' dialogue, the development of the theme of βελτίον γίνεσθαι turns out to be more linear and consistent according to the order proposed by Joyal (2, 1, 3): while in the second fragment Socrates speaks of «improvement» (τὸ ὀνησον) at the general level of certain human activities, the references to this issue in the first fragment (ὠφελῆσαι) and in the third one (ὠφελήσαιμι ἂν, βελτίω ποιῆσαι) are directly applied to Alcibiades. Instead, if we keep the passage about Alcibiades' moral improvement at the beginning of the sequence, we must suppose a sort of «detour» from the point that Aeschines aimed to highlight, with only a minor emphasis on what must have been a crucial topic.

More generally, the new sequence of arguments seems to lead more naturally to the third fragment, where Socrates mentions his relationship with Alcibiades again: given the relevance of the character of Alcibiades in the dialogue, it is unlikely that he was mentioned only in view of wider discussions of the concepts of θεία μοῖρα and τέχνη. It seems far more plausible that Aeschines introduced the theme of θεία μοῖρα to give an account of the effects on Alcibiades of his συνουσία with Socrates and of his ἔρωσ.

³³ The English translations of Aelius Aristides' *De rhetorica* are by BEHR, C. A., *P. Aelius Aristides. The complete works*, vol. 1: *Orations 1-16*, Leiden, 1986.

³⁴ DITTMAR, H., *Aischines von Sphettos*, 272-274.

³⁵ On the problem of the order of the three fragments within Aeschines' dialogue –and for a more detailed analysis of their philosophical content– I shall refer to PENTASSUGLIO, F., *Eschine di Sfetto. Tutte le testimonianze*, pp. 95-97 and to PENTASSUGLIO, F., «Philosophical Synousia and Pedagogical Eros: on Socrates' Reshaping of Paideia», *Philosophie antique*, 20 (2020), pp. 80-81.

³⁶ On the ambiguous syntax of the expression διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν, see KAHN, C. H., «Aeschines on Socratic Eros», p. 94 and KAHN, C. H., *Plato and the Socratic dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form*, pp. 22-23.

³⁷ See JOYAL, M. A., «The Conclusion of Aeschines' *Alcibiades*», *Rheinisches Museum*, 136/3-4 (1993), pp. 264-268.

What is more relevant for our purposes is that, if we accept this different order, Socrates turns out to adopt an argument by analogy: he would first be presenting some examples drawn from human experience (sickness and healing), where it is possible to benefit from both ἀνθρωπινή τέχνη and θεία μοῖρα 2); then, he would be applying this opposition to his personal experience with Alcibiades, expressing his conviction that he could improve the young man θεία μοῖρα and not τέχνη (1).

According to this order, Socrates employs a kind of argumentation that finds some parallels in Aeschines' works, namely in the *Aspasia*, as we have seen, and in the *Miltiades*³⁸, as we will see in a while.

Before moving on to examine the *Miltiades* fragment, however, a further testimony on the *Alcibiades* can be considered for the sake of our analysis. It consists of a brief papyrus fragment (*POxy.* 1608 col. I fr. A = VI A 48 SSR = 74 P.)³⁹ where a specific type of argument by analogy can be singled out: the so-called «expert-analogy».

Socrates' expert-analogies have recently been dealt with and defined by Sandstad as «a group of arguments where Socrates makes an analogy from an uncontroversial expert, or an expertise, like the cobbler or ship-captain, to another often controversial expert like the statesman»⁴⁰. The occurrence we find in Aeschines' *Alcibiades* falls within this definition:

«Do you consider that men have to begin by being ignorant of music (ἀμουσους) before they become musicians? Or ignorant of horsemanship (ἀφιππους) before they become good riders?» «I think they have to begin by first being ignorant of music and horsemanship.» (tr. G. C. Field)⁴¹.

The fragment, which is thematically related to *POxy.* 1608 col. I fr. D (VI A 48 SSR = 73 P.), probably preceded the *excursus* on Themistocles' exile in Asia contained in fragments E, F and G of the same papyrus and reported by Aelius Aristides in *De quatt.* 348-349 (VI A 50 SSR = fr. 76 P.). The dialogical exchange seems to suggest a Socratic ἔλεγκος centred on the theme of the need for education: Alcibiades, who went so far as to criticise the Athenian politician⁴², had presumably put forward the argument that Themistocles, particularly in his youth, was far from being

an exemplar (fr. D hints at the issue of Themistocles' disinheritance by his father). In this context, Socrates may have replied that, just as a musician or a horseman is ignorant of his subject when he begins his career, so –by analogy– a statesman like Themistocles was initially ignorant of statesmanship.

Such an argument may then have led to the digression about Themistocles' vicissitudes in Asia⁴³, where Socrates insists on the fact that the statesman's qualities, great as they were, did not suffice to save him from a miserable end.

This is not, however, the only occurrence of this specific sort of argument by analogy within Aeschines' dialogues: a second one can be found in the *Miltiades*.

4. THE MILTIADES

Unlike the *Aspasia* and the *Alcibiades*, the surviving testimonies and fragments allow us to only partly reconstruct the content of the *Miltiades*. The most recent textual acquisition is represented by two papyrus fragments which are not included in any of the editions preceding Giannantoni's *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae* (the first collection to have been published after the Oxyrhynchus finds at the beginning of last century)⁴⁴. The two fragments (*POxy.* 2890 *recto* and *verso* = VI A 79-80 SSR = 121-122 P.) are thematically related and deal with the issue of παιδεία.

For the purpose of our account, it is worth commenting on just one of the two (*POxy.* 2890 *verso*):

[. . . οὐ . . .] δεινόν, ἔφην ἐγώ,
[ἡμεῖς μὲν περὶ τούτου ἀ]ποροῦμεν, ἐκεῖ-
[νος δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν,] οὐκ ἀπορήσει. θω-
[μαστὸν γάρ ἂν εἴη, εἰ μὲ]ν ἡρόμην Εὐρύπι-
[δην δημιουργῶν] ὅτω ξυνῶν ἂν Μιλ-
[τιάδης ἀριστ]α βουλευόιτο ὅπως χρῆ
[ὑποδήματα] ποιεῖν, εἴ[χ]εν ἂν μοι λέ-
[γειν ὅτι τοῖς σκυτοτόμοις ἢ ὅτωι ἂν
[ξυνῶν ἀρ]ιστὰ βουλευόιτο ὅπως
[χρῆ οἰκία]ν οἰκοδομεῖν, καὶ τοῦτ' εἴ-
[χεν ἂν λέγ]ειν ὅτι τοῖς τέκτοσιν, νῦν
[δέ . . .]

It will [.. not ..] be at all strange, I said, if the problem that stumps us doesn't stump him. For it would

³⁸ On this parallel see ROSSETTI, L. & LAUSDEI, C., «Ancora sul Milziade di Eschine Socratico: P. Oxy 2890 (Back)», *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*, 33 (1979), pp. 50-51.

³⁹ On the text and collocation of the fragment see COLLART, P., «Les papyrus d'Oxyrhynchus», *Revue de Philologie, de Littérature et d'Histoire anciennes*, 43 (1919), pp. 56-57; ROSSETTI, L. & ESPOSITO, A., «Socrate, Alcibiade, Themistocle e i 'dodici dèi'», *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*, 54 (1984), p. 28; ROSSETTI, L., *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini*, vol. 1.1: *Autori noti*, Firenze, 1989, p. 122.

⁴⁰ SANDSTAD, P., «The Logical Structure of Socrates' Expert-Analogies», p. 319; cf. APARICIO VILLALONGA, C., *El ejemplo de los oficios en los diálogos de Platón*, pp. 18-46.

⁴¹ FIELD, G. C., *Plato and his Contemporaries*, London, 1948, p. 148.

⁴² Ael. Aristid. *De quatt.* 348.

⁴³ For this hypothesis see ROSSETTI, L., *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini*, p. 131.

⁴⁴ GRENFELL, B. P., «New Papyri from Oxyrhynchus», *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, 5/1 (1918), pp. 16-23; GRENFELL, B. P. & HUNT, A. S., *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, 13, London, 1919, pp. 1-27.

have been surprising if I had asked Euripides which craftsman he should spend time with in order to best deliberate about making shoes –he could answer «cobblers»!– or which he should spend time with in order to best deliberate about building houses; also in this case he would be able to answer: «architects». But now [...] (tr. K. Lampe, modified)⁴⁵.

According to the reconstruction hypothesis proposed by Patzer⁴⁶, the fragment seems to imply a question of the following kind against the background of the conversation: to whom should Miltiades turn to in order to be well advised about how men should be educated? Socrates then, setting out from an analogy with the banausic arts, brings Euripides into the discussion and replies on his behalf as to what «mentor» one should follow in specific fields of expertise.

The text suggests the positing, within Socrates' speech, of a double opposition. On the one hand, the self-evident nature of the questions regarding the expertise required by certain τέχνηαι –and particularly the (simpler) search for appropriate teachers to learn specific craft techniques– seems to stand in contrast to the greater difficulty of acquiring the kind of competence to which Socrates lays claims (and with regard to which the text only allows us to form conjectures). On the other hand, the fragment seems to establish an opposition between a sure knowledge, characteristic of poets (ἐκεῖνος [...] οὐκ ἀπορήσει) and a different type of knowledge, marked by *aporia* (ἡμεῖς [...] ἀποροῦμεν).

Now, as far as the first opposition is concerned, it is plausible that Socrates' question relates to the search for true teachers of virtue or wisdom (given the contiguity with *POxy.* 2890 *recto*, concerned with this topic).

The meaning of the whole passage largely depends on the interpretation of the *περὶ τούτου* at line 3, and particularly on the kind of knowledge Socrates is referring to here. Indeed, the sense of the subsequent argument considerably changes depending on whether the allusion is still to the search for teachers of ἀρετή, –which Socrates had conceivably discussed earlier, before moving on to the analogy with the banausic arts– or whether he is already referring to the latter, namely to the search for teachers

of the various τέχνηαι, a problem that «doesn't stump him» (ἐκεῖνος [...] οὐκ ἀπορήσει).

If the former is the case, as I shall argue here, the mention of Euripides may be interpreted as follows: while Socrates and other interlocutors in the dialogue have some difficulty in identifying the true teachers of ἀρετή, a poet like Euripides has no doubt about it. Socrates' remark in this case would be polemic –as well as ironic, as Rossetti⁴⁷ has suggested– and directed against the poets' pretence of knowledge⁴⁸. If this interpretation is correct, a better understanding of the fragment may be gained through a comparison with a parallel passage in the *Memorabilia*, where Xenophon reports a conversation about justice between Socrates and Hippias (4.4.5)⁴⁹. Within this discussion,

«He was saying that if you want to have a man taught cobbling or building or smithing or riding, you know where to send him to learn the craft: some indeed declare that if you want to train up a horse or an ox in the way he should go, teachers abound. And yet, strangely enough (θαυμαστὸν εἶη), if you want to learn Justice yourself, or to have your son or servant taught it, you know not where to go for a teacher» (tr. E. C. Marchant)⁵⁰.

Besides the common reference to craftsmanship skills, it is worth noting that the comparison is introduced with a similar expression (θαυμαστὸν γὰρ ἂν εἶη in Aeschines; θαυμαστὸν εἶη in Xenophon), and that the difficulty to find teachers of virtue is expressed with the same verb (ἀπορεῖν)⁵¹.

The two texts thus seem to share the idea that, while one may easily answer the question of who can teach a particular craft technique, it is harder to identify the experts in παιδεία, a domain –we may infer from the context– which clearly bears greater relevance⁵².

Also in the *Miltiades* fragment, therefore, Socrates may intend to show how absurd it is to have clear ideas about who can teach shoemaking or house-building, while failing to detect who can teach wisdom. Put differently, Socrates here may have emphasised the inconvenience of not being able to single out true teachers precisely in the most important sphere; at the same time –and for the same

⁴⁵ LAMPE, K., «Rethinking Aeschines of Sphettus», in ZILIOLI, U., *From the Socratics to the Socratic Schools: Classical Ethics, Metaphysics and Epistemology*, London, 2015, p. 63.

⁴⁶ PATZER, A., «Αἰσχίνου Μιλτιάδης », *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*, 15 (1974), p. 285. The Greek text of the papyrus just quoted also follows Patzer's hypothetical reconstruction (pp. 280-285).

⁴⁷ ROSSETTI, L., *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini*, p. 145.

⁴⁸ Cf. Plat. *Apol.* 22a-c.

⁴⁹ On this parallel see already ROSSETTI, L. & LAUSDEI, C., «Ancora sul *Milziade* di Eschine Socratico», p. 50.

⁵⁰ MARCHANT, E. C., *Xenophon. Xenophon in Seven Volumes*, vol. 4, Cambridge-London, 1923.

⁵¹ For the reference to shoemakers, see Plat. *Men.* 90b-c.

⁵² In this regard, a parallel can also be drawn with Xenophon's *Apology* (20-21), where Socrates finds it «amazing» (again θαυμαστὸν) that while in any field –medicine, legislative assemblies, the election of generals– the people of Athens follow the advice of experts, which they prefer to others' opinions, they sentence to death the man who has the highest competence in education (περὶ παιδείας), namely «in what is man's greatest blessing».

reason— he may have stressed the special difficulty of such a search and warned against the kind of rashness in which poets incur and to which an (undue) analogy with τέχνη leads.

Two final points can be made before moving on to some conclusions:

1. The *Miltiades* fragment is included by Sandstad among the occurrences of Socrates' expert-analogies. Admittedly, the mention of shoemakers and builders connotes the argument as one of those «where Socrates makes an analogy from an uncontroversial expert, or an expertise»⁵³. Socrates' argument also seems to include a comparison to «another often controversial expert», but the latter cannot be indisputably identified with the statesmen, at least according to what can be inferred from the (fragmentary) text of the testimony.

There seems to be no textual evidence of a direct comparison to statesmanship as a point of reference, as Sandstad instead assumes when he hypothesises that: 1) Socrates continued the argument by asking Euripides the question: «but now, who should Miltiades spend time with in order to deliberate best about statesmanship?»; 2) Euripides answered that Miltiades needed to turn to the expert on statesmanship (the statesman); 3) Socrates replied that just as we should learn shoemaking from the cobbler, so we should learn statesmanship from the statesman.

The only clue confirming this reconstruction might come from the figure of Miltiades himself, but scholars have convincingly argued against his identification with the winner of the Battle of Marathon⁵⁴. Moreover, if this were really how Socrates' argument developed, we would lose the thematic continuity with *POxy.* 2890 *recto*.

Even apart from these considerations, if our interpretation is correct, the *Miltiades* fragment features a use of the expert-analogy different from that outlined in the *Alcibiades* fragment, what leads us to the second point.

2. As in the *Aspasia*, the argument by analogy does not appear to be deployed for explicative or exemplifying purposes: the examples of cobblers and builders are employed within an argument aimed at warning the interlocutor *against* an undue, misleading analogy with these expert figures.

According to this interpretation, Socrates would be expounding the idea that the search for «teachers» of virtue is particularly difficult, from which it follows that teaching virtue is not a τέχνη like any other, and that therefore there cannot be «experts» on ἀρετή or wisdom as there are experts in other fields. It is noteworthy that such a conclusion is in agreement with the above-mentioned testimony on the *Alcibiades* (Ael. Aristid. *De rhet.* 1.61), where Aeschines' Socrates disclaims being able to make Alcibiades better τιμὴ τέχνη.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Owing to the fragmentary state of Aeschines' Socratic dialogues, the aspects of the Socratic method we have been focusing on, namely ἐπαγωγή and the argument by analogy, cannot be investigated in the same way as they would in relation to Plato's or Xenophon's works.

A set of specifications, sub-classifications and related issues, in particular, cannot be applied to texts whose content largely depends on conjectures, and to dialogues whose arguments cannot be reconstructed in their entirety. This is the case, for instance, with the three types of ἐπαγωγή singled out by Robinson⁵⁵, with the further distinctions drawn by McPherran⁵⁶, and with the different possible interpretations of the expert-analogies (as intuitive, analytic, probabilistic, or statistically probabilistic) discussed at length by Sandstad, who ultimately interprets them as deductively valid inferences⁵⁷.

Yet, some final considerations can be made in the light of the broader accounts in Plato and Xenophon (and in related studies).

As far as the epagogic argumentation is concerned, we can rely on a single continuous account in Aeschines' dialogues: in the *Aspasia* passage examined in section II, Aspasia adopts an inductive reasoning that —according to Cicero's definition— is intended to win the interlocutor's approval of a doubtful proposition based on its resemblance to «certain undisputed facts» to which he or she has assented.

In the absence of any point of comparison —since the *Alcibiades* fragments are not quoted as a continuous passage, we do not have enough context— we are evidently unable to distinguish and discuss different types of ἐπαγωγή

⁵³ SANDSTAD, P., «The Logical Structure of Socrates' Expert-Analogies», p. 319.

⁵⁴ See already HERMANN, K. F., *De Aeschinis Socratici reliquiis*, p. 10, who refers to Herodotus' account (6.38); see also ROSSETTI, L., *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini*, pp. 137-138 and PATZER, A., «Αἰσχίνου Μιλτιάδης», p. 274, note 12.

⁵⁵ ROBINSON, R., *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, pp. 35-38.

⁵⁶ McPHERRAN, M., «Socratic Epagōgē and Socratic Induction», p. 349 ff.

⁵⁷ SANDSTAD, P., «The Logical Structure of Socrates' Expert-Analogies», pp. 322-329.

in Aeschines' works. Nonetheless, one may cautiously argue that Aspasia does not use her list of cases to *explain* her claim to Xenophon and his wife (as, for example, Socrates does with Eutyphro in Plat. *Euthyph.* 10a-d)⁵⁸. Hence, this use of epagogic argumentation does not seem to be traced back to the so-called «explicative ἐπαγωγή» (what Vlastos called «intuitive induction»). It rather resembles another form of ἐπαγωγή, singled out by McPherran (*contra* Vlastos), which Socrates would use «to persuade interlocutors to adopt various beliefs»⁵⁹. Indeed, Aspasia's argumentation seems to fit the definition provided for this kind of ἐπαγωγή, whereby Socrates «reveals belief-inconsistency in interlocutors only *after* he convinces them to adopt a belief or two that they had not previously held (beliefs inconsistent with other, possibly less-well-grounded beliefs they already profess to hold)»⁶⁰. While, however, the *Aspasia* passage seems to confirm that Socratic ἐπαγωγή could rise from the level of mere explanation («explicative ἐπαγωγή») to the level of what McPherran calls «inductive» or «persuasive» ἐπαγωγή, the textual evidence at our disposal does not permit to go so far as to interpret it as a «probable inductive generalization employing a survey of coordinate cases involving intuition of the universal»⁶¹.

Similarly, although the *Alcibiades* fragments may be seen as describing a case of inductive generalisation –from the specific case of healing people from sickness to the more general ability of «benefiting» or «improving» others– it should be noted that (just as in the *Aspasia*) such generalisations are adduced only in relation to some concrete case under consideration. Moreover, the Aeschinean Socrates never offers a classic inductive generalisation composed of a large number of samples. However, this raises the thorny issue of the distinction between Greek ἐπαγωγή and modern induction, which cannot be addressed within the limits of this paper⁶².

What can be noted, before moving on to some final remarks about the argument by analogy, is that to neither passage from Aeschines' works can we apply Aristotle's definition of ἐπαγωγή as a «passage from particulars to universals» (*Top.* 1.12), or its exemplification («the argument that supposing the skilled pilot is the most effective, and likewise the skilled charioteer, then in general the skilled

man is the best at his particular task») ⁶³, which instead bear some resemblance to Socrates' argument in Plat. *Euthyd.* 279d-280b. As noted by Ausland⁶⁴, while Aristotle's illustration ends with a general proposition, otherwise parallel passages in Socratic literature tend to reach a particular conclusion – albeit of a different order from the argumentative examples adduced for its sake. Aeschines' account thus seems to reinforce his conclusion that Aristotle both defines and exemplifies inductive argumentation in more abstract terms than Socratic literature.

As regards, more specifically, the argument by analogy, our analysis has revealed at least two uses or functions of this methodological tool.

1. In the *Aspasia* and in the *Miltiades* the argument by analogy (including the sub-type of the expert-analogy) is employed by Aspasia/Socrates to *indirectly* achieve their final aim, and hence with an (at least initially) *negative* function. The enumeration of coordinate cases is not designed to directly lead the interlocutor to an inductive generalisation; indeed, by applying the same reasoning formerly adopted *by analogy* for previous cases, he or she ends up in *aporia* or error: the undesirable conclusion that one prefers one's neighbour's partner to one's own (in the *Aspasia*), or the fallacious conclusion that teachers of virtue or wisdom can be found as easily as the teachers of some specific τέχναι (in the *Miltiades*).

In both cases the use of analogies paves the way for a different, less obvious conclusion. Within the conversation with Xenophon and his wife, Aspasia resorts to a set of analogies to induce the spouses to acknowledge that they will always be in search of what they consider best, unless they are able to ensure that there will be «no better man or finer woman on earth». In brief, the argument by analogy «Socratically» serves the aim of promoting moral improvement in others.

In the *Miltiades* –if the interpretation proposed is correct– the use of analogies occurs within an argument which raises two crucial points in Socratic philosophy: on the one hand, the opposition between two kinds of knowledge and (presumably) the critique of poets'

⁵⁸ McPHERRAN, M., «Socratic *Epagôgê* and Socratic Induction», p. 349, note 6.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 349. McPherran argues, in particular, against the assumption that «virtually all cases of *epagoge* are cases of explicative *epagoge*» (*ibid.*, p. 355), so interpreting Socratic ἐπαγωγή as the «ancestor of those inductive inferences that lead interlocutors to what they ought to believe» (*ibid.*, p. 359).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 354. For some parallels in Plato and Xenophon, cf. *Charm.* 159b-160d; 167c-168b (see also *Euthyph.* 7a6-8a8; *Lach.* 192b9-193d8) and *Mem.* 1.2.9.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 363.

⁶² On this problem (and for the relevant bibliography), see AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», pp. 224-228 (particularly note 2), to which I shall also refer for a detailed overview of modern interpretations of Aristotle's definition of the term; cf. ANNAS, J., *Aristotle's Metaphysics. Books M and N*, Oxford, 1976, p. 154.

⁶³ Sandstad goes so far as to affirm that expert-analogies should not be treated as inductions at all, but are much better seen as illustrative parallels. In his opinion, in *Meth.* 13.4, 1078b27-29 Aristotle is actually thinking of παραβολή rather than of ἐπαγωγή, and hence the emphasis on induction in the scholarly literature is misleading: see SANDSTAD, P., «The Logical Structure of Socrates' Expert-Analogies», p. 320 and note 4.

⁶⁴ AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», p. 229.

knowledge⁶⁵; on the other hand, the difficulty of finding truly “competent” people in the domain of παιδεία⁶⁶, especially when one expects to find them among the experts on other τέχνηαι.

2. Quite differently, in the *Alcibiades* Socrates adopts an argument by analogy in order to draw a fundamental distinction between τέχνη and θεία μοῖρα as two alternative ways in which one can improve others (Alcibiades, in his case). Healing from sickness –which can occur either through an ἀνθρωπίνη τέχνη or by divine dispensation– represents an example that Socrates draws from human experience in order to lay claim to the ability to improve the young man θεία μοῖρα, and more specifically «through love» (as stated in 1.74). The argument by analogy thus seems to be employed, in this case, with a more explicit corroborative function, although we are not able to determine whether Socrates, in the dialogue, specifically resorts to it in order to obtain or cement the interlocutor’s consent to his claim.

Moreover, the reference to sickness and healing, that is to say to the medical art, once again recalls the domain of τέχνηαι. Aelius Aristides’ testimony can thus be connected to the papyrus fragment from the same dialogue (*POxy.* 1608 col. I fr. A), mentioning musicians and horsemen, and to the one from the *Miltiades* (*POxy.* 2890 verso) dealing with cobblers and builders⁶⁷.

In conclusion, although the surviving testimonies do not allow us to reconstruct the logical framework of the Aeschinean Socrates’ expert analogies, some basic resemblances can be outlined between Aeschines’ account and those provided by Plato and Xenophon. First, all three of them make ethics an integral part of Socrates’ methodological toolbox: Socrates is not presented as seeking to logically infer universal statements though the complete enumeration of particular cases; he rather chooses examples which prove suitable for gaining his interlocutors’ agreement. Second, as a consequence, the choice of exemplary cases closely depends on the context: as emerges particularly from the *Aspasia* passage, the various groups of *exempla* are used with a view to their familiarity to the interlocutors⁶⁸. Finally, in Aeschines’ account we can easily glimpse the Socrates who, in Plato, «prattles» (as his interlocutors often complain) about menial craftspeople in order to test general principles concerning the «craft» of virtue⁶⁹, as well as the Socrates depicted by Xenophon,

whose favourite topic is «cobblers, builders and metal workers»⁷⁰.

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⁶⁵ Cf. Plato’s *Ion* (particularly 530c), as well as Xen. *Symp.* 3.5-6; 4.6 and *Mem.* 4.2.

⁶⁶ Besides the already mentioned passages from Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* (4.4.5) and *Apology* (20-21), see Plat. *Lach.* 185e-186c; 200e. Here Socrates draws attention to the requirements for a διδάσκαλος τεχνικός (185a-e) and claims he cannot be considered to be such a teacher (186b8-c5).

⁶⁷ On the occurrences of the same analogies in Plato see APARICIO VILLALONGA, C., *El ejemplo de los oficios en los diálogos de Platón*, pp. 144-161 (on cobblers); pp. 162-184 (on builders; cf. 76-95); pp. 315-394 (on doctors); pp. 497-536 (on musicians); pp. 160, 197, 501, 548 (on horsemen).

⁶⁸ AUSLAND, H. W., «Socratic Induction in Plato and Aristotle», pp. 245 and 249.

⁶⁹ See *Gorg.* 491a; *Symp.* 221e; *Hipp. Ma.* 288d.

⁷⁰ Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.37.

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