Avicenna’s Proof for God’s Existence: the Proof from Ontological Considerations

Abstract

Se argumenta que, en Avicena, sólo existe una prueba de la existencia de Dios, y sólo un modo de establecer dicha prueba desde su sistema metafísico – derivada de nociones a priori entre las que juega un papel esencial la noción de existencia wujūd. La prueba configura un escenario de conocimiento discursivo a priori.

This paper argues that there is only one proof for God’s existence in Avicenna, and only one way for establishing the proof within his metaphysical system. This metaphysical proof is essentially derived from a priori notions, among which the notion of existence (wujūd) has the central role. Avicenna’s proof is structured in such a way that all its concepts are either derived from the meaning of ‘existence’ or are connected with this meaning. In this sense Avicenna’s proof sets out a scenario of discursive a priori knowledge established purely on considerations of fundamental ontological meanings such as ‘existence’, ‘existent’, ‘thing’, ‘necessary’, ‘possible’, ‘impossible’, ‘one’ and ‘cause’.